If it seems like OpenAI is shaking up the IT market every other day or so, that is because that is precisely what it is doing. The company needs dozens and dozens of gigawatts of compute capacity to pursue its AI superintelligence dreams – perhaps more – and that means setting up suppliers to compete against each other and lining up astronomical amounts of financing to back up the deals it is cutting with datacenter and system builders.
Like everyone else, we thought that Broadcom already had a deal with OpenAI, and wrote as much back in early September in Broadcom Lands Shepherding Deal For OpenAI “Titan” XPU. This is when Broadcom went over the financial results for its third quarter of fiscal 2025 on August 3, and Hock Tan, Broadcom’s chief executive officer, let it be known that in addition to the three hyperscalers and cloud builders that have contracted with Broadcom to shepherd their custom AI XPUs through the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co foundries – that would be Google, Meta Platforms, and ByteDance – a fourth XPU customer had emerged and Broadcom had just “secured over $10 billion of orders of AI racks based on our XPUs.”
We assumed that Broadcom was citing the value of the racks to pump up the numbers and that it would only receive a piece of the $10 billion action, but have subsequently confirmed that Broadcom is indeed building AI cluster racks for this customer and will be generating all of the $10 billion for its revenue stream. (How much Broadcom is subcontracting – if at all – remains to be seen.) And with this move, Broadcom has expanded from being a chip and board maker to an original design manufacturer, or ODM. And, a pretty big one at that.
So on Monday, which was a holiday for us at The Next Platform, when we heard that Broadcom’s stock was up like a rocket thanks to its formal announcement of a deal with model builder OpenAI, we didn’t give it a second thought, kept sipping our coffee, and working on some carpentry projects.
But as the morning wore on, we caught wind of a CNBC report on Bloomberg radio whereby Charlie Kawwas, president of Broadcom’s Semiconductor Solutions Group (the chip part, not the software part), said in an interview with OpenAI president Greg Brockman that the mystery $10 billion customer was not OpenAI. If you read the response Kawwas made carefully, he said that Broadcom had not yet received a $10 billion purchase order from OpenAI, “so I hope that answers the question.” That response actually did not answer the question. But everyone took it as a backhanded confirmation that the $10 billion deal for AI cluster racks – not just chip shepherding and packaging – was not from OpenAI, and certainly not for its rumored “Titan” AI XPU for inference.
The statement put out by Broadcom said that it was working on 10 gigawatts of AI cluster gear for OpenAI that would include AI accelerators as well as Ethernet-based networking for scale up interconnects between the XPUs (and possibly the CPU hosts in the rackscale infrastructure) and across racks with scale out networks. The racks will be “scaled entirely with Ethernet and other connectivity solutions from Broadcom,” which sounds like Broadcom’s Scale Up Ethernet (SUE) over Tomahawk Ultra chips to us. Shipments are expected to start in the second half of 2026 and will be done by the end of 2029. The statement said further that Ethernet is being used for scale up and scale out in the AI racks, and that PCI-Express switches would also be used – presumably to connect to host X86 processors.
Only a week ago, when AMD inked a 6 gigawatts infrastructure deal with OpenAI and Nvidia had inked its own 10 gigawatt deal with the company, the word going around was that OpenAI was interested in 17 gigawatts of total capacity in the middle term over the next few years. With this deal, which presumably is for more compute and networking that costs less per unit of capacity and does include shepherding the rumored “Titan” XPU co-designed by OpenAI and Broadcom, the total capacity is now 26 gigawatts. In terms of gigawatts, that gives Broadcom 38.5 percent share, Nvidia 38.5 percent share as well, and AMD 23 percent share of the power draw. Presumably, AMD would have a slightly larger share of compute than Nvidia, and Broadcom would account for even more, if we assume that Titan will really drive price/performance for inference hard. We don’t know anything about the Titan chip, but it has to drive the cost per token down for inference or it would not be worth the trouble.
It is not hard to imagine the same economics in play as with Nvidia’s own “Rubin CPX” for long context window processing. The Rubin CPX uses GDDR7 frame buffer memory, not HBM, and is cheaper and not as blazingly fast. But the overall price/performance of a mixed rack of top-end “Rubin” GPUs for decoding the GenAI models and Rubin CPX for processing and maintaining the context that is added as part of a query. OpenAI is focused on driving down the cost of inference with Titan, which may be paired with an Arm-based CPU much as Nvidia does with its prior Grace-Hopper superchips, its current Grace-Blackwell superchips, and its future Vera-Rubin superchips coming next year.
It is the ODM manufacturing relationship that Broadcom seems to have with OpenAI and the mysterious Customer Number 4 announced in early September that is perplexing to us inasmuch as Broadcom is competing with its customers such as Arista Networks, which makes network gear from Broadcom chips. To be fair, any company wants one throat to choke if possible, so having Broadcom deliver racks instead of chips eliminates some of the finger-pointing between vendors when things go wrong. This also allows for Broadcom to deliver more value and to possibly drive more profits. It will certainly deliver more revenues, given that 10 gigawatts of capacity will drive somewhere around $300 billion to $325 billion in AI cluster revenues by our estimate for GB300 NVL72 systems, and that would be about 12 million Blackwell GPU chiplets.
Inference XPUs burning the same 10 gigawatts of power in the aggregate might be much more numerous and much less costly per unit, and Ethernet interconnects instead of NVSwitch like the Nvidia rackscale systems use will presumably be a lot less costly, too. Providing 1.5X to 2X the FP4 oomph for inference per dollar spent would be an interesting gap for OpenAI to open up with Nvidia iron.
Someone has to do it, and OpenAI is motivated to get it done for enlightened self-interest reasons. But even then, this will end up being a hell of a lot more money for Broadcom than that $10 billion coming from Mystery Customer Number 4. Like somewhere around $160 billion to $200 billion over four years inclusive from Actual Customer Number 5, OpenAI.


Timothy Prickett Morgan wrote, “… given that 10 gigawatts of capacity will drive somewhere around $300 billion to $325 billion in AI cluster revenues by our estimate for GB300 NVL72 systems …”. According to analysts at Barclays, each gigawatt of capacity produces about $35 billion of Nvidia revenue, with the remainder of the datacenter cost (cooling, power, building, land) being $15 billion. So 10 gigawatts of capacity is about $350 billion of chips, with a significant fraction of that being memory chips. The total chip price for 10 GWatts from Broadcom, 10 GWatts from Nvidia and 6 GWatts from AMD is (10 + 10 + 6) x $35 billion = $910 billion. The announcements from Broadcom, Nvidia and AMD have suggested this is all server hardware. I see no possible way OpenAI could raise enough money to buy $910 billion of server chips or rent anywhere close to that much from Oracle. OpenAI’s annual subscription revenue is currently $10 billion.
The only way I can see for OpenAI to buy anywhere close to this many chips is for OpenAI to create a hardware device and sell the hardware device to their end-users. OpenAI currently has 800M end-users. If OpenAI grows their user base to 2B end-users and 10% of those end-users pay for a hardware device containing $2K of chips, that would be $400B of chips. The price of the hardware device might be $5K if the hardware device contains chips that cost $2K.
There were 1.25B information workers globally in 2018 according to Forrester so 200M information workers using this hardware device would be roughly the highest paid 1/6th of total information workers. To achieve this level of sales, the hardware device would need to have close to human-level AGI so that every well paid white collar worker would need it to be competitive in their job. The employers of the users have to pay for the chips and electricity they use. The most secure way to do this is for OpenAI to sell a hardware device that runs behind the customer’s firewall. If a user runs the device 24 hours per day, the user’s employer pays a higher electricity bill, not OpenAI. For high-end consumer use, a hardware device would probably need a price under $1K, which could mean it runs a smaller model than the professional device. I posted a comment about this here:
https://www.nextplatform.com/2025/10/06/did-amd-use-chatgpt-to-come-up-with-its-openai-partnership-deal
Yup. I get it.
After thinking about it a little more, I realized that Nvidia, Broadcom and AMD will have different gross margins on their sales to OpenAI and the revenue per GWatt will be higher when the gross margin is higher. Presumably, Nvidia will have the highest gross margin, Broadcom will have the lowest and AMD will be somewhere in the middle.
Using the numbers in Timothy Prickett Morgan’s article, 10 GWatts from Nvidia will be $300B to $325B of revenue and 10 GWatts from Broadcom will be $160B to $200B of revenue. For a ballpark figure, I will assume AMD’s revenue per GWatt is halfway between Nvidia and Broadcom: ($30B + $16B)/2 = $23B to ($32.5B + $20B)/2 = $26.3B. For 6 GWatts, AMD’s revenue can be guesstimated as 6 x $23B = $138B to 6 x $26.3B = $158B. If OpenAI or their subcontractor (Oracle) really buys 10 GWatts from Nvidia, 10 GWatts from Broadcom and 6 GWatts from AMD, this would be a total of $300B + $160B + $138B = $598B to $325B + $200B + $158B = $683B. Since all of these numbers are estimates or guesstimates, I would call that approximately $600B to $700B of total sales.
I still see no possible way OpenAI could raise enough money to buy or rent this much server hardware. As soon as it becomes practical, I think users and their employers will prefer to do LLM inference behind their company firewall. OpenAI will still need some datacenter hardware for training. What’s badly needed are some more DeepSeek-like algorithmic breakthroughs to lower the cost of training and inference. Within the next couple of years, I expect OpenAI to quietly tell their suppliers behind closed doors that they have made such a breakthrough so they no longer need $600B to $700B of server hardware.
If OpenAI and other frontier model developers make good progress toward human-level AGI, there will still be lots of inference hardware needed. As described in my previous post, I think OpenAI will sell a lot of inference hardware to their customers. This customer-owned inference hardware will reduce OpenAI’s capital requirements, reduce their operating expenses and generate a lot of profit for OpenAI. This inference hardware will use chips from Broadcom and others. Nvidia, AMD and others will also sell a lot of hardware used for inference. It won’t be the end of the world if all of the $600B to $700B of server hardware sales to OpenAI doesn’t materialize.
I tried to imagine some way OpenAI could afford $600B to $700B of server hardware over the next 4 years. Suppose we make the extremely optimistic assumption that OpenAI’s subscription revenue doubles every year for the next 4 years: $10B + $20B + $40B + $80B = $150B. OpenAI could get $100B of investment from Nvidia, $100B from selling AMD stock and $100B in additional investment from sovereign wealth funds. Suppose OpenAI needs $100B to pay their employees and for other expenses. To afford $600B to $700B of server hardware, OpenAI would need an additional $250B to $350B above what I just mentioned.
It would be incredibly impressive if OpenAI’s hardware business could go from zero to generating $250B to $350B of profit over 4 years. Sam Altman has said he wants to sell 100M hardware devices faster than any other product in history. If each hardware device produced $2500 to $3500 of profit, 100M devices would produce $250B to $350B of profit.
If OpenAI’s hardware product is the Surveillance Noose that Ben Geskin generated a picture of, it would make about $100 of profit per unit. In the extremely unlikely event that 100M units of such a device could be sold, that would generate $10B of profit. I think the Surveillance Noose would be an embarrassing failure in the market. The enterprise version of Google Glass sold 2M units before it was discontinued. The Surveillance Noose would probably have similar sales. Since it would be a controversial product that would damage OpenAI’s brand, the Surveillance Noose would probably reduce OpenAI’s consumer subscription revenue.