We did not think that today we would be writing about Pat Gelsinger “retiring” from the company that he loves best and most.
Intel’s prodigal and now former chief executive officer was one of the few executives in the semiconductor industry who was trained by the company’s co-founders Gordon Moore, Robert Noyce, and Andy Grove. And no matter how you cut it, the fact that Gelsinger is leaving Intel does not bode well for the company that he came back to lead during the most serious crisis it has faced since leaving the DRAM memory business in the late 1980s.
This crisis is arguably more severe, which is why Gelsinger left VMware in January 2021 to take the helm of Intel. At the time, in What Gelsinger Can Do To Unscrew Intel, we outlined the parallels from 1987 when Grove ascended to the CEO job and when it exited the DRAM business and when Gelsinger was taking the top job. We are not going to reprise all of those thoughts here.
But what we are going to do is draw parallels to IBM’s self-described “near death experience” in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the mainframe market imploded at the same time that RISC/Unix systems ascended in the datacenter and client/server computing shifted a lot of application work from datacenter systems out to the desktop. This was when John Akers, the consummate mainframer and Big Blue insider, was at the helm and did not read the market forces even close to correctly.
It is not a pretty comparison between IBM and Intel or Akers and Gelsinger.
Back in the late 1980s, when Big Blue was at its absolute peak, the company had over 400,000 employees, with half of them being in the United States. This is when we entered the datacenter market ourselves, and it was an exciting time with maybe 25 different chip architectures in systems and maybe 40 operating systems that had some market penetration. But the inevitable consolidation was coming, and IBM was the biggest and richest target for the competition.
In 1991, IBM laid off around 30,000 employees and booked a $3.4 billion charge, reporting a $2.8 billion loss for the year. In 1992, IBM’s revenues shrank a bit and it lost nearly $5 billion and the employee count dropped by close to another 43,000. This left IBM with just above 300,000 people worldwide and an employee base that had shrank by nearly a quarter in two years. In 1993, revenues went down a few more percent and IBM cut another 45,000 employees and posted a whopping $8.9 billion in restructuring charges and an $8.1 billion loss against $62.7 billion in sales. That was it for Akers, who “retired” in April that year and American Express executive Louis Gerstner was brought in by the board of directors to replace him. In his first year (1994), IBM boosted revenue by two points to $64 billion and actually posted a $3 billion profit, but Gerstner continued the layoffs; the employee count shrank by 36,000 to 220,000 worldwide.
All during this time, there was talk of breaking IBM into “Baby Blues,” separating its PC, mainframe, X86 server, other proprietary servers (AS/400), Unix servers, middleware and database software, printers, and services businesses into separate companies to give them freedom to maneuver in the market. Gerstner decided – and we think correctly – that keeping IBM together and pivoting strongly to services and getting its software running on other systems was smarter than breaking the company up. IBM bought Lotus for its middleware, sold off low-end printers, and righted its financial ship through huge stock buybacks that rewarded IBMers and Wall Street for growth in earnings per share. (We call this burning the furniture in the house to stay warm.)
We could argue as to whether or not this strategy has worked. But a lot of the IBM that was then is still around now, despite it subsequently selling off DRAM memory, disk drives, PCs, high-end printers, X86 servers, and various services businesses. The mainframe and Power server businesses are relatively healthy and profitable, and IBM owns Red Hat and soon HashiCorp. It is a one possible equilibrium state Big Blue could have engineered.
The question we have – and that the Intel board of directors has been facing – is will we be able to say the same about Intel ten or twenty years from now?
Which brings us all the way back to Gelsinger, who is absolutely as Intel Inside as Akers was True Blue. And who had only cut 15 percent of the Intel workforce thus far into a turnaround process that lasted about as long as the one Akers tried to do and resulted in a nearly 50 percent reduction in the IBM workforce.
If Gelsinger had a health issue that means he cannot fulfill his fiduciary duties as chief executive officer, then Intel would have to say that in its announcement of Gelsinger’s “retirement” because it is such a material fact about the state of the company and the strategy that was put into place by Gelsinger several years ago. It doesn’t look to us like Gelsinger is tired, much less retired, and that means all we can surmise is that Gelsinger is being shown the door as a repudiation of the IDM 2.0 strategy where Intel revives its floundering foundry business and revitalizes its dependent chip design business at the same time.
Maybe Gelsinger could not make the very deep job cuts and strategy changes that were necessary to get Intel financially healthier sooner – just like Akers could not. Both are too close to the companies they run, and they would have to bear that shame personally. Running companies like IBM and Intel is extremely difficult, and economies and markets change fast. Look at how quickly Nvidia went from interesting HPC accelerator to the largest and most profitable systems business we have seen since IBM’s System/360 mainframe in the 1960s and 1970s.
Intel is still an innovator in chip packaging and transistor design, despite its lapses in the past decade, and given a decent manufacturing process, we still think that Intel can create a compelling X86 processor for PCs and servers.
It is important to remember that Intel still has two-thirds of the share of the X86 server market, and the X86 server recession that has plagued Intel and bothered AMD – and that we think was caused in part by a shift in focus on spending for AI systems – is largely over.
But the problem is that the X86 server matters less and less in the datacenter except as a legacy platform for Windows Server applications, which is itself the last proprietary operating system on Earth with volume economics driving it. And it has been shrinking ever so slowly over the past decade as Linux is on the rise and the variety and volume of server CPU platforms based on the Arm architecture that can run it are also increasing. The hyperscalers and cloud builders as well as a number of HPC centers in the world have their own Arm processors. Nvidia has one, and we think at some point AMD might need to blow the dust off its own Arm server chip efforts. Combined, these organizations represent a growing base of server CPU acquisitions, and as we have said before, we can envision a day when AMD, Intel, and the Arm collective all have large and relatively equal shares of the server CPU pie.
This is not a world where Intel can extract huge profits from X86 CPUs, as it was able to do in the 2010s when it essentially had a monopoly on datacenter compute. (Much as Nvidia does on datacenter GPU accelerator compute today, and is benefitting mightily from.)
As we said four years ago, Intel has to decide if it wants to be a foundry or a chip designer. It may not be able to do both and still be Intel. And maybe instead of keeping these two companies together, it does indeed need to separate them so they can go their own ways and either live or die separately.
We think the Intel Products group will have an easier time switching to Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Co as a foundry than the Intel Foundry will have making a dent in TSMC as a secondary source for chips. The forecasts for Intel and TSMC show this – and we did the math back in April showing that TSMC will have an AI chip manufacturing business that is larger than all of Intel Foundry before too long.
Maybe the answer is that TSMC buys the Intel foundry business to get a footprint – a real one – in the United States and a place to carry on once China invades Taiwan. (This gets more and more likely as time passes, and with a Trump administration starting in a few weeks and an expected ramping of the trade war with China, it may happen sooner rather than later.) TSMC would, in this doomsday scenario, keep current Intel processes alive, give Intel employees jobs, and give Intel Products – what we will call Intel if this comes to pass – a foundry for the future as TSMC builds out capacity in the United States.
This is what IBM tried to do in 2014 when it paid GlobalFoundries to take its IBM Microelectronics division that, among other things, etched its Power and z mainframe chips. (This didn’t work out so well, with IBM suing GlobalFoundries three years ago and switching to Samsung as its foundry partner, but don’t let that scare you.)
The client PC business at Intel is relatively healthy at around $30 billion per year with on the order of $10 billion in operating profits, which is one reason why Michelle Johnston Holthaus, a sales executive from the PC business who was elevated to general manager of its marketing and communications operations in 2017 and who was made general manager of its Client Computing Group in January 2022 by Gelsinger himself, is now CEO Intel Products and co-CEO of all of Intel Corp alongside of chief financial officer Dave Zinsner. Frank Yeary, who was the independent chair of Intel’s board, is now the executive chair, and Naga Chandrasekaran, who was named general manager of Intel Foundry in July this year, remains in that role.
The statement put out by Intel does not indicate a change in Intel’s strategy, but its leadership, but it also says that Gelsinger retired when we all believe he was asked to leave because the turnaround was not happening fast enough.
“While we have made significant progress in regaining manufacturing competitiveness and building the capabilities to be a world-class foundry, we know that we have much more work to do at the company and are committed to restoring investor confidence,” Yeary said in that statement. “As a board, we know first and foremost that we must put our product group at the center of all we do. Our customers demand this from us, and we will deliver for them. With MJ’s permanent elevation to CEO of Intel Products along with her interim co-CEO role of Intel, we are ensuring the product group will have the resources needed to deliver for our customers. Ultimately, returning to process leadership is central to product leadership, and we will remain focused on that mission while driving greater efficiency and improved profitability.”
Yeary went on to say that Intel would simplify its product portfolio and advance its foundry capabilities. There is no hint of selling off the foundry business. And for all we know, Gelsinger wanted to break Intel up and the current board does not – just like Akers thought about it and Gerstner put the kibosh on the idea.
We don’t know.
What we also don’t know is how a Trump administration might use executive orders and national security to compel US-based tech giants to use an indigenous US foundry – whether it is owned by Intel, TSMC, any cluster of private equity companies, or maybe even Uncle Sam itself. The US government could federalize Intel Foundry for its own purposes without denting the US Treasury balance sheet. Without question, the semiconductor business and national security are in jeopardy because Intel dropped the ball on advanced manufacturing processes a decade ago.
It will be very interesting to see who Intel tries to bring in as CEO, and when, and what happens then.
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Loan Guarantees like the Automakers received and no more talk about what if and what may happen. AMD existed for years running on fumes and had revenues to remain in business and to keep the lenders happy and leaders who renegotiated that debt to make things easier for AMD back then! And that Chips Act funding is predicated on Intel keeping 51% ownership of Intel Foundries and so any non US interest can NOT acquire any majority/controlling share of Intel Foundries!
I think the Chips Act can be amended any time the situation warrants it. And I agree, AMD had to earn it. But of all of the chip designers, Intel was the only one to keep foundries here in the States. And that is different, especially considering the geopolitics of the situation.
Sometimes, equality is treating different things differently. And I fully expect for Intel — meaning the foundry — to be handled differently than AMD was. AMD sold off its foundry because that was a rich man’s game and used the funds to keep the company moving ahead. If China invades Taiwan, I expect a very different scenario than if it doesn’t.
I agree about the loan guarantees. Why not?
A merger between Intel and AMD would indeed create a more formidable competitor to TSMC, Samsung, and other leading semiconductor manufacturers. Here are some potential benefits of this alliance in terms of competing with TSMC and bringing home critical technology:
_Combined Manufacturing Prowess_: Intel and AMD could leverage their collective manufacturing expertise, capacity, and resources to create a more robust and competitive semiconductor manufacturing ecosystem.
_Increased Investment in R&D_: By pooling their resources, the combined entity could invest more heavily in research and development, enabling them to better compete with TSMC’s significant R&D expenditures.
_Improved Access to Advanced Node Technology_: A merger could provide Intel and AMD with better access to advanced node technology, such as 3nm, 2nm, and beyond, which would help them stay competitive with TSMC.
_Enhanced Capability for Chiplet Architecture_: The combined entity could accelerate the development and deployment of chiplet architecture, which would enable them to create more complex, heterogeneous, and powerful semiconductor products.
_Increased Domestic Capacity and Reduced Dependence on Asian Supply Chains_: By investing in domestic manufacturing capacity, the combined entity could reduce its reliance on Asian supply chains, mitigating risks associated with geopolitical tensions, trade disputes, and supply chain disruptions.
Regarding bringing home critical technology, a merger between Intel and AMD could facilitate:
_Repatriation of Advanced Semiconductor Manufacturing_: By combining their resources and expertise, the merged entity could accelerate the repatriation of advanced semiconductor manufacturing capabilities, reducing dependence on foreign suppliers.
_Development of Domestic Chip Design and Manufacturing Ecosystems_: The combined entity could invest in developing domestic chip design and manufacturing ecosystems, fostering a more robust and resilient semiconductor industry in the United States.
While a merger between Intel and AMD is speculative at this point, it’s clear that such a combination could have significant implications for the semiconductor industry, global supply chains, and the competitiveness of American technology companies.
Pat its gone, ¡Great Pat! It make great CEO task but it abandoned by twice time Intel (abandoned…?). If CEO AMD Lisa SU, its humble and wily devil, hiring Pat its great option. Pat knows extraordinary well the industry silicon world. Prophecy… Soon two-headed CEO on sunnyvale company ??
HA! I can’t unsee that image in my head….
@WINETNUT, why do you think AMD has fab experience any more? They sold off Global Foundries and now get stuff from TSMC. AMD has skill in the design of processors and stuff, but I bet most of their low level expertise in actual Fabrication of chips is gone, or limited to the design kits from the vendors on how to use process nodes.
Sure, they have people who know alot about how it all works, but people who do actual etching? Not so much.
Now maybe AMD and Intel together would turbo-charge things, but I suspect the real answer is for Intel Foundries to possibly merge with GlobalFoundries for them to turn into a TSMC-like fab only partner, who doesn’t care who uses their systems.
Intel the chip designer (and the one who I would expect to keep the name Intel) would then fab with whomever they can get to do the be job.
The new Foundry company would need some deep deep pockets to take on TSMC, but if the US Govt requires stuff to be made in the US, that’s a big hammer to wield.
In a merger scenario, the combined entity would bring together:
1. Intel’s strong brand, manufacturing capabilities, and research expertise.
2. AMD’s innovative products, agile business model, and growing market share.
3. Lisa Su’s exceptional leadership, technical expertise, and vision.
The synergy between these components could create a more formidable competitor in the semiconductor industry. Lisa Su’s leadership would be a crucial factor in unlocking this synergy, as she has proven her ability to drive innovation, growth, and success at AMD.
*Value Creation: 1 + 1 + Lisa Su > 3*
The combined entity would likely experience:
1. Increased competitiveness
The value created by this merger would be greater than the sum of Intel and AMD’s individual values, thanks to the synergy and leadership that Lisa Su would bring to the table.
In summary, the concept of the sum of the parts being larger than the whole suggests that a merger between Intel and AMD, with Lisa Su at the helm, could create a more powerful and competitive entity in the semiconductor industry.
1. *GlobalFoundries would gain access to Intel’s advanced node technology*: Intel’s foundry business has been investing heavily in advanced node development (e.g., 7nm, 5nm, and 3nm). GlobalFoundries would benefit from accessing these advanced nodes, enhancing its competitiveness.
2. *Increased capacity and scale*: The combined entity would have a larger capacity, allowing GlobalFoundries to better serve its existing customers and attract new ones.
3. *Diversification of customer base*: GlobalFoundries would gain access to Intel’s customer base, reducing its dependence on a single customer (e.g., AMD) and increasing its diversification.
4. *Improved financials*: The merger could lead to cost savings, increased efficiency, and improved profitability for GlobalFoundries.
In contrast, Intel might not benefit as much from the merger, as it would likely involve spinning off its foundry business, which could lead to:
1. *Loss of control over its manufacturing destiny*: Intel would no longer have full control over its manufacturing capabilities.
2. *Reduced influence over the direction of the combined entity*: As a minority stakeholder, Intel might have limited influence over the strategic direction of the combined company.
So, while both companies might benefit from a merger, GlobalFoundries would likely be the main beneficiary.
Global Foundries need to get rid of the failures from IBM and Motorola in its leadership. Even Intel Fab people, clearly failed at 4 nm, would be better than the GloFo leaders who gave up at 10 nm and chose to run away from high density logic.
GloFo was saddled from the beginning with the failures from not just AMD but also from IBM & Motorola. In depth modeling applied to process development is still not done well. I do not know this Naga now in charge of PD at Intel but seems that very conflicting claims about the yields and defect trends for 1.8 A are being made. The best way to get device design & yields up is to put PhDs in Solid State and Metallurgists / Materials Scientists in charge and keep the EE hackers out.
Pat was an incompetent with stupid ideas, lack of vision, which promoted more incompetent management under him driving to big loss for Intel. Only an idiot would hire him.
Poor guy started as a Tech and scraped his way up to a MS in CS, not a great training for Fans which is very different from the virtual world of coding or the world of Design using pre packaged EDA software. Fab is science in action everyday, requires as leaders PhDs like PT’s predecessors as Intel CEOs Andy G. and Craig B. ). The US has been losing competitiveness in Fabs because much too abundant EEs w/o adequate training keep gate crashing into Fab management on strength of the fact that they can do and understand the results of e-test s a nd they are after all the end users of Chips.
My take on Gelsinger departure and new CEO its not MJ.
1) The board got cold feet under investor pressure on the result of initially a poor situation assessment the picture in an Intel invented reality was just too rosy and some powers figure they were misled. I’ve reported since the beginning the issue of monopoly cost overhang, price at cost operations, the potential Intel would place itself into Chapter 11 and well before Gelsinger became CEO.
2) The how to swallow, originally back in q4 2021, up to $234,500,000,000 in capital investment.
Arizona Expansion, $20 B
Rio Rancho Retrofit $3.5 B
Hillsboro Modernization $3 B
Leixlip Retrofit $8 B
Ohio Greenfield $100 B
Europe $33 B to $95 B
Italy Packaging $4.5 B
Germany Greenfield $18 B with a $781 prepayment
Personally, I would let the whole situation play out, these companies I’ve seen it before the sacrificial lamb, the baby thrown out with the bath water, it happens; Otellini poisoned was my take, Krzanich set up and he knew better the beauties who use all their natural advantages, a lot of them are industrial spies, and then the Chrisitan gets crucified?
I liked Gelsinger for bringing in cultural exposure from outside of Intel culture and the let’s do it attitude. Maybe it was ‘just’ do it that I comprehend having been in leadership roles working in industry and also in sports facing the need for both in specific situations.
Then I liked Krzanich for getting rid of the Intel Inside supply signal in 2016 and Intel Inside in 2018. Only for Intel Inside to come back in 2021 after Gelsinger arrives and that’s an area of Holthaus responsibility as head of CCG marketing.
Intel Inside would again be shut down in it’s horizontal cartel form leaving 2023 only to be brought back for Dell in its vertical form this last quarter which is MJ and CCG marketing.
There are factions with internal players doing their bidding within any enterprise especially State of Intel, and foremost, the ‘spin the fabs’ off contingent which I do not support and have not completed that audit.
My take is the faction that keeps Holthaus in power, ripping Intel off for billions of dollars in unnecessary marketing costs appeasing channels while with Intel legal keep the CEO and board in the dark. Certainly, a misrepresentation by Intel marketing and legal department intent on conduct, and the retaliation should I expect any less, Intel factions attempting to get away with their 13-year violation of Docket 9341 consent agreement at Part IV(A)(1)(7) all the while I’m counseling as monitor to correct.
Pursuant correcting the marketing and communications the legal department, all of which are my fields of expertise, woman managerially, strategically operating on best practice in the palatial organization is how men best handle this. Let the smart woman take the player’s among them out and the reason is smart woman operating interpedently don’t like competing with mistresses or privileged placements. Men operate differently allowing junior eyes and ears on the street for intelligence and control purposes they’re not always the sharpest tools in the shed. From a human resource perspective in a microprocessor design producer there can be creativity voids. Engineers who cannot design as in make good on their high-level tool value to the organization, the better one’s end up in sales and product management, and least creative end up in marketing that can present organizational difficulties especially when they become a favorite of an outside vendor. Mike’s thoughts on human resource a hybrid between Machiavelli’s The Prince and Gracian’s Art of Worldly Wisdom.
3) What Gelsinger and Zinsner found out was the at cost operation and situationally organizational elephantiasis associated monopoly cost overhang that was known necessitating right sizing, to $35 B annual my take, which was an inflection for me this last quarter, where every quarter has been at or near an ‘at cost quarter’ including CCG faking it’s operating margin not accounting for the R&D charge against product sales. This culmination presented a breaking point.
4) What Gelsinger and Zinsner did not know because the legal department and the marketing department are crooks and concealed it. Recall my celebration on November 26, the Chip Act reduction to $7.86 B accommodates within 6.2% the sum of the Intel Inside price fix Federal False Claims recovery for that GSA procurement overcharge. By law Chip Act funds were unavailable to Intel sans the federal false claims theft repayment. This suggests, and the wheels are in motion, that Intel will be put on a payment plan for the States Intel Include price fix recovery the sum of $20,510,500,000.
Again, I would have allowed the situation to play out with Gelsinger in lead. As a consultant would walk right in and right size the operation’s cost structure to $35 B in sales; marketing, product management, communications, investor relations, legal down to skeleton crew of 10 people per department. I’ve not done an audit but if those departments cannot be run like a start-up they’re too large. Audit to determine state of foundry as one component of a federated conglomerate, tour what are no more than a handful of prospects to access their buy-in under the private golf (gold) club model, and report back here at 30, 60, 90 and 130 days.
Subject CEO search Holthouse started at Intel in PR supported and moved up by the proximate entities including all the Intel Inside publishers that stole and ripped off Intel for 30 years Holthaus is out.
If not Zinsser who did not know but now knows he was handed a price at cost operation I’d rather have Rene James as CEO put James in a World Wrestling mud pit with Holthaus and watch Rene James cut Holthaus’s throat.
CEO James is tough nosed put into a hard job at Ampere Davidow always said it was the hard jobs, the hard whole product that proves your worth.
CEO James, Andy Grove might be your friend, but he is not my friend, nor is Otellini and his crew that remains inside Intel needs to be walked out. That includes all in Intel legal department who are trying to escape their contract sales racket.
And if James doesn’t take the CEO job I will go in and audit Intel and release all those findings here to cost optimize the whole entity at $35 B annual and get all the input necessary on a 5 to 7 major customer foundry buy-in to the IF private golf club model.
So said Mark Liu with foundry tenure, Intel Foundry does not need a foundry super star. Zinsner has shown himself successful to those who noticed net profit of $1 per unit produced for the last four quarters, for those knowing how to decompose a financial on data that is not some invented reality. Making that $1 is an industrial management best practice when operating at cost. It showed operations skill but how many noticed on associate clutter and the mimicking syndicate repeaters.
The operation stars are already at Intel. What Intel needs is foundry buy-in from 5 to 7 large customers primarily with big chips to begin because that’s what Intel has proven viable at Intel 3 based on nascent and still incomplete outside production assessment; $0.55 per mem^2 of area for a finished component.
Mike Bruzzone, Camp Marketing
(could you please delete the variant without line breaks?)
You refreshingly lead with the right question, but I‘m afraid you’re asking it at the wrong level of granularity.
It starts with treating the Intel foundry business as a whole. And even if I am a bloody outsider (geographically and know-how), I can’t help myself asking: who’d even want it all?
Probably that’s because I remember the shock of just how much IBM charged for their foundry business.
Sure it’s a lot of assets, but what about the liabilities? Right down to the cost of cleanup if they were to dismantle it today and leave green pasture: how much would that cost vs its current value?
I can see lots of spilled coffee over that question, but today that’s a due dilligence item.
Probably the only one to buy Intel with little hesitance (at nearer Global Foundry prices than a patriotic premium) would be China.
That’s because they’d hold no punches picking it apart into very tiny pieces, separating the technology from the culture and the people and leaving behind every asset that is actually a liability: surprisingly free market from a people’s republic…
In a world without digital divides the depth of the Mariana trench, an Intel replaced by green pastures wouldn’t leave the world without things it desperately needs: there is nothing they produce where others aren’t capable and willing of filling in. At least in terms of technology, perhaps scale would take more time.
But would converting Intel fabs to something TSMC-like operations be cheaper than building new ones for that capacity? Isn’t that what Mr. Gelsinger failed to do in the time he was given?
Currently my impression is the board lacks the confidence that the intermediary steps in that direction won’t fail and bust Intel in a free market. And the board might look for salvation in a China like heavy hand from a Trump administration to steady it.
But even if such a government were to be filled with a few musky men also wise, the perceived and real value of all IDF assets are burning at a rate that keeps accelerating, with only the Intel patent troll making a bit of money.
We might see something new here: too big to fail may turn into too big for any nation to save from dramatic desintegration, because it’s also largely running at software speeds.
Who benefits from an Intel breakup ?
Consultants, Lawyers, Shareholders, and Boardmembers.
It’s a forgone conclusion that Intel will be broken up in 2-5 years. They should announce it in the 1st quarter of 2025 and have it completed by the beginning of 2H of 2026. But the Intel board won’t let it go that fast. In fact the Intel board is the main problem now. Calcified, financialized and constipated thinking is the currency of the realm for Intel’s board.